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Abstract
The synthetic control method is an empirical methodology for
causal inference using observational data. By observing the
spread of COVID-19 throughout the world, we analyze the data
on the number of deaths and cases in different regions using
the power of prediction, counterfactual analysis, and synthetic
interventions of the synthetic control and its extensions. We
observe that the number of deaths and cases in different re-
gions would have been much smaller had the lockdowns been
imposed earlier and had the re-openings been done later, es-
pecially among indoor bars and restaurants. We also analyze
the speculated impact of herd immunity on the spread given
the population of each region and show that lockdown policies
have a very strong impact on the spread regardless of the level
of prior infections.
Our most up-to-date code, model, and data can be found
on github: https://github.com/niloofarbayat/
COVID19-synthetic-control-analysis
1 Introduction
In December 2019, an outbreak of an infectious disease was
identified in China, caused severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a.k.a. COVID-19. In March
2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the
COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic [1]. While the first case was
traced back to November 17, 2019, [2], by July 9, 2020, more
than 550, 000 deaths have been reported globally from almost
12 million reported cases [3].
During the spread of COVID-19, different regions took dif-
ferent measures in controlling and containing it. In some, the
lockdowns were very strict and started early on, and mask man-
dates were strict, whereas in some others, they were more flex-
ible, and the lockdowns started later or were removed quickly
during the spread. Besides the policies, the dominant lifestyle,
population, central air conditioning, etc. may impact the spread
of the virus differently in different regions. Therefore, the ques-
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Figure 1: COVID-19 cases in a) different regions in the Globe
b) different regions in the U.S.
tions of what are the best policies in each area to slow down the
pandemic and how to assess the impact of individual policies
remain controversial.
The classical epidemiological models may fail to predict the
exact pattern of COVID-19 spread. The spread of this pandemic
has shown completely different behavior in different regions,
both in the number of cases and in the fatality rate. Figure 1
depicts the the number of cases over time in five different re-
gions of the globe (a), and four different regions of the U.S.
[4] (b)1. Furthermore, Figure 2 depicts four different examples
of how the spread and fatality rate vary in different states of
the U.S. From these examples, this is apparent that we need a
data-driven, non-parametric way to look at things, and classical
epidemiological models fail to do so. Therefore, we have intro-
duced our synthetic control model to analyze the virus spread
in different regions with different patterns.
Abadie and Gardeazabal [5] and Abadie et al. [6] pioneered
the synthetic control method to address the problem of measur-
ing the impact of a new regulation or a change in a region, and
comparing it to the case that those changes had not happened.
The idea of synthetic control stems from the classical A/B test-
1Note that in all figures of this paper which depict the number of daily
cases/deaths, the moving average over 7 days is presented rather than the abso-
lute value, to minimize the effect of potential noise in the existing reports.
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Figure 2: COVID-19 cases and deaths in four different states of
the U.S.
ing, where two versions of a variable are compared in the oth-
erwise identical environment [7]. A variation of that would be
where one of the variables is a placebo. In that case, the exper-
imental units are called “treatment” and “control” groups, and
the variable changes, i.e., treatments, are applied to the treat-
ment group [8]. Abadie et al. suggested that since in some
problems we cannot have an actual control group, we construct
a “synthetic” control group for the treatment unit, using the un-
treated units as the donor pool.
The synthetic control is a statistical method used to evaluate
the impact of an intervention in observational data by perform-
ing comparative case studies. In comparative case studies, re-
searchers estimate the evolution of aggregate outcomes (such
as mortality rates, average income, crime rates, etc.) for a unit
affected by a particular occurrence of the event or intervention
and compare it to the evolution of the same aggregates esti-
mated for some control group of unaffected units [6].
In the analysis of COVID-19 data on the number of cases
and deaths, there might be some missing data that may cause
an additional noise we need to account for. COVID-19 tests
may not have been done extensively in numerous regions, es-
pecially in the early stages of the spread. Furthermore, in most
places, the death data only accounts for hospitalization cases.
Since the classical synthetic control method may not perform
well given some randomly missing data and the high variance
noise, we use robust synthetic control, which is a generaliza-
tion of the late [9]. The robust synthetic control method per-
forms “de-noising” estimations that are theoretically sound and
computationally efficient. Additionally, we employ the recently
developed extension of the synthetic control method known as
synthetic interventions [10], to predict the impact of different
interventions in different regions.
Our main contributions and findings are listed below:
• We build a counterfactual model to measure to what extent
lockdown and reopening dates impact the spread.
• We demonstrate via a counterfactual model the impact of
imposing the lockdown earlier in New York, with our esti-
mates predicting an upwards of 80% reduction in the num-
ber of deaths.
• We analyze the impact of bars and indoor dine-in in caus-
ing the spread, where the former has a stronger impact on
the spread than the latter. We also analyze the impact of the
speed of reopening in causing the second wave observed in
the US.
• We explore the question of "herd immunity" and whether
the infection level has a stronger impact on the further
spread of the virus compared to social distancing mea-
sures. Our results indicate that social distancing measures,
at current infection levels in the US, have a measurable
impact on the spread.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides a brief review of the existing related work. In Section 3
we provide a background on synthetic control. Section 4 intro-
duces our methodology to apply robust synthetic control to the
problem of COVID-19 spread and regulations impact, and Sec-
tion 5 presents our findings. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 6.
2 Related Work
Abadie et al. first introduced synthetic control to measure the
impact of political instability on economic prosperity [5], in
which They investigate the economic impact of conflict, using
the terrorist conflict in the Basque Country as a case study. They
used the combination of other regions in Spain to build a “syn-
thetic” control region which resembles economic characteristics
of the Basque Country before the outset of terrorism attack. Af-
ter that, the method has been widely applied in econometric of
policy evaluations including studying the effects of laws [11],
legalized prostitution [12] and immigration policy [13].
The method has also been utilized outside economics: in the
social sciences, biomedical disciplines, engineering, etc. For
example, Kreif et al. used the synthetic control approach to a
setting of evaluation of P4P (pay-for-performance) health pol-
icy where there were multiple treated units [14]. Opposing to
general belief by that time, they showed that P4P significantly
increased the mortality of nonâA˘Rˇincentivised conditions .On
the other hand, Doris et al investigates if natural disasters help
or hurt politician’s electoral fortunes [15], in which they study
on a case of catastrophic flooding in the American South in
1927, and also showed that use of synthetic control methods
and suggest thatâA˘Tˇeven if voters distinguish between low- and
high-quality responsesâA˘Tˇthe aggregate effect of this disaster
remains broadly negative.
3 Background
One of the technical challenges in modeling the impact of any
interventions is accurately modeling the spread of the infection.
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This depends on many factors including the characteristics of
the disease and its spread, and also prevailing societal norms.
There is a vast literature on epidemic modeling including the
classical SIR and SEIR models [16] that consider a fluid ap-
proximation for the spread of the infection. While these give a
reasonable approximation in many settings, the model predic-
tions are extremely sensitive to the parameters. Since these are
estimated from noisy time series data, these are inherently sub-
ject to statistical estimation error leading to a higher variance in
model predictions. Moreover, these fluid models are largely ho-
mogeneous require several simplifying assumptions that limit
the ability to modeling many aspects or features specific to a
particular region. These pose a significant hurdle in reasonably
modeling the impact of various interventions for policy deci-
sions based on these fluid approximations.
The goal of this work is to develop approaches to model the
impact of pandemic interventions that overcome the limitations
of standard approaches. In particular, our first goal is to de-
velop a non-parametric approach based on synthetic control to
study the impact of interventions. Most existing methods in epi-
demiology, including the SEIR model, focus on the dynamics
of the size of the population within each category. These mod-
els often involve some differential equations for the dynamics
of population size and relationship among different categories,
which are mostly simple and straightforward. These models re-
main powerful tools to understand the transmission dynamics
of the coronavirus, however, the model assumptions can be vi-
olated due to complicated circumstances, especially when var-
ious non-pharmaceutical interventions are implemented day by
day.
These concerns motivate us to develop more flexible and
non-parametric approaches to understand the dynamics of the
spread of the coronavirus. Another concern, especially when
trying to understand the intervention effects, is possible bias
from naive comparisons as discussed a lot in the causal infer-
ence literature. Specifically, the usual comparison between pre-
intervention and post-intervention periods may suffer from bi-
ases due to unobserved time trends. For example, the reduction
in transmission rates of the coronavirus may be due to weather
change instead of the new social distancing policy. Also, the
usual comparison between intervened city/country and non-
intervened one may suffer from selection bias. For example, the
city which implemented strict policies (such as stay-at-home)
may suffer from a more severe attack of the coronavirus, and
simply comparing cities with and without stay-at-home policy
may underestimate the policy effects.
Due to the concerns listed above, we propose to use synthetic
control to infer the causal effects of the interventions of interest,
based on which we hope to provide useful policy suggestions to
mitigate the spread of the coronavirus. The synthetic control
methods try to find a linear combination of non-intervened re-
gions as an approximation (i.e., a synthetic control) of the inter-
vened region, by matching pre-intervention characteristics such
as population size and socioeconomic status. We then compare
the post-intervention period of the intervened region and the
synthetic control to estimate the intervention effects.
3.1 Synthetic Control and Proposition 99
A canonical application of the synthetic controls method is the
analysis of the policy of Prop99 on cigarette sales. In November
1988, California voters approved the California Tobacco Tax
and Health Protection Act of 1988, also known as Prop 99 [17].
This initiative increased the state cigarette tax by 25 cents per
pack and added an equivalent amount on other tobacco prod-
ucts. Aside from making tobacco products more expensive to
the customers, the revenue raised was used for various environ-
mental and health care programs, talks in schools and colleges
on the harms of tobacco, and anti-tobacco advertisements and
research. Eventually, after this proposition, smoking reduced
in the state of California. But there is an important question
regarding the effectiveness of this policy: was the reduction of
smoking because of Prop 99 or did society move on from smok-
ing? Since the nationwide data showed the reduction of smok-
ing on average as well, the question is how to assess the role
Prop 99 played in that reduction in California.
One way to answer this question in an ideal world would be if
we had two California states, one with Prop 99, and one without
it. But unfortunately, this cannot happen. To answer this ques-
tion, Abadie et al. [6] proposed the synthetic control model
to represent California as a linear combination of the other 49
states of the U.S.
Suppose we have a smoking matrix for the U.S. Let’s as-
sume the columns of this matrix are the time series of per-capita
smoking, and each row represents a different state. Although
smoking habits are not the same in different states, there are
some correlations among per-capita smoking due to the level of
awareness to the smoking, the state of economy, etc. In syn-
thetic control, we take the smoking data of California for a pe-
riod of time right before Prop 99 was implemented (1988). For
that given period, we try to approximate the time series of Cali-
fornia as a linear combination of the other states. The high-level
algebraic idea is that the smoking matrix is approximately low-
ranked given the correlations among the states, since the rows
would not be linearly independent. By building this approxi-
mation of California pre-intervention (before Prop 99), we can
approximate California post-intervention.
Figure 3 shows both the synthetic control view and A/B test-
ing view of the impact of Prop 99. The vertical dashed lines
represent the time when Prop 99 was passed. The solid curve
represents the raw data of California, and the dashed curves
are the synthetic models building California from the rest of 49
states. In the synthetic control view, unlike the Conventional
A/B testing view, the dashed line closely follows the solid line
before Prop 99. Synthetic control gives a more precise and in-
formative answer to the counterfactual “What if there was no
Prop 99”. Hence, in the synthetic control model we observe
that the per-capita cigarette sales decrease more sharply in the
actual California as opposed to the synthetic one. Therefore, we
can claim that Prop 99 did have an impact on smoking.
For any controlled trial, we can ask and answer questions
“what is the impact of this change more precisely. In this work,
we analyze the impact of lockdowns on the spread of COVID-
19. We answer questions about the start of lockdown such
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Figure 3: synthetic control versus A/B testing view for the state
of California before and after Prop 99.
as “what if there was no lockdown” or “what if schools were
closed earlier”, and in case of opening up the states, “what if
they were opened a few days or a few weeks earlier or later”.
If the treatment unit is in its evolution, but the donor pool
is ahead in its evolution, then we can predict how the treat-
ment unit is going to behave. This way, we may build synthetic
control models for both counterfactuals as well as predictions.
In this work, we build a model to achieve both by analyzing
COVID-19 data.
3.2 Robust Synthetic Control
The robust synthetic control method is a generalization of
the classical synthetic control method [9]. It makes the syn-
thetic control estimation robust to randomly missing data and
high variance noise. This generalization estimates the syn-
thetic control weights using the unobserved mean values in-
stead of the noisy observations. This estimation is done by
“de-noisingâA˘Z´âA˘Z´ the data matrix using matrix completion
and then using least squares regression to determine the syn-
thetic control weights. It is a computationally efficient method
with intuitive theoretical guarantees. Furthermore, the counter-
factual outcome can be estimated by any linear combination of
the donor units, relaxing the convex constraints on the weights
in classical synthetic control.
Data and model Our observation matrixX looks like the fol-
lowing:
X = [Xit] =
[
Dpre Dpost
Ipre Ipost
]
,
where Xit denotes the metric (e.g., deaths) at location i at
time t. Dpre is a matrix of the donor pool pre-intervention
death counts, Dpost is a matrix of the donor pool post-
intervention death counts, Ipre is a matrix of intervention units
pre-intervention donor-pool metrics and finally Ipost is the ma-
trix of intervention units post-intervention metrics.
As in [9], we assume
Xit =Mit + it, (1)
whereMit is the deterministic mean while the random variables
it represent zero-mean noise that are independent across i, t.
Based on the theory of latent variable models [18, 19, 20, 21,
22], we can state
Mit = f(θi, ρt), (2)
where θi ∈ Rd1 and ρt ∈ Rd2 are latent feature vectors cap-
turing unit and time specific information, respectively, for some
d1, d2 ≥ 1; the latent function f : Rd1 ×Rd2 → R captures the
model relationship.
The treatment unit obeys the same model relationship during
the pre-intervention period. That is, for t < T 0,
X1t =M1t + 1t, (3)
where M1t = f(θ1, ρt) for some latent parameter θ1 ∈
Rd1 , ρt ∈ Rd2 . If a unit had no intervention then equation (2)
would apply to both pre- and post-intervention periods. [9] in-
dicates that the outcome random variables for all donor dispatch
areas follow the model relationship defined by equations (3) and
(1). Therefore, the “synthetic controlâA˘I˙ would ideally help es-
timate the underlying counterfactual means M1t = f(θ1, ρt)
for T0 ≤ t ≤ T by using an appropriate combination of the
post-intervention observations from the donor pool. In other
words, M1t are the estimated metrics if there was no interven-
tion applied to the treatment unit.
The last step in the process is to obtain the final synthetic
control, i.e., the weights βi’s. To that end, we assume that
the mean vector of the treatment unit over the pre-intervention
period, i.e., the vector M−1 = [M1t]t≤T0 , lies within the
span of the mean vectors within the donor pool over the pre-
intervention period, i.e., the span of the donor mean vectors
M−i = [Mit]2≤i≤N,t≤T0 . More precisely, we assume there
exists a set of weights β∗ ∈ RN−1 such that for all t ≤ T0,
M1t =
∑N
i=2 β
∗
iMit. The βˆi’s can be obtained as an estimate
of true β∗i ’s via a process of regression on the de-noised ver-
sion Mˆ of the observation matrixX, and they are the synthetic
control weights.
4 Methods
4.1 Data preprocessing for COVID-19 spread
In the case of pandemics, unlike synthetic control applications
such as Prop 99, where everything happens at the same time
in different regions, the virus becomes active at different times
in different places. For instance, the COVID-19 spread started
during November in Wuhan, but in New York, it hit in January,
and in India, it arrived even later. Since the virus reaches dif-
ferent places at different times, the curves for the number of
cases/deaths would also be at different stages of evolution at a
given time.
To find correlations among different regions for the spread
of COVID-19, we first align the timelines. One idea is to start
tracking each region when it hits a threshold of deaths/cases
(either absolute or population adjusted), and then assume the
day the region hits that threshold is t = 0. Different regions
are now “aligned” on when the virus was active there. Figure
4 depicts the number of deaths in different regions, where the
4
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Figure 4: the number of deaths in different regions since 100
COVID-related deaths occurred in each region.
x-axis represents the relative timeline in each region measured
by the number of days passed since 100 COVID-related deaths
happened.
We use this information to build synthetic COVID-19 mod-
els. First, we pick a donor pool of regions where COVID-19
spread has been active for a number of days larger than some
threshold, e.g. 30 days. We then pick target areas where the
spread has been active less than the original threshold, and more
than a lower threshold, e.g., 15 to 30 days. After that, we build a
model using the donor pool for a low threshold number of days
(15 days) and do predictions for the rest of the interval (15−30
days) in the target areas. Since for some target areas we have
data for more than 15 days, we can compare the synthetic re-
sults to the actual data for those regions. In other words, we
train the model using 15 days of data and test the model using
the rest 15 to 30 days.
However, the problem with this alignment with thresholds is
that it does not account for control measures such as lockdowns,
social distancing, etc. On the other hand, classical epidemiol-
ogy models depend heavily on R0, the infection rate, which de-
fines how quickly the disease spreads. All the control measures
to “flatten the curve”, such as social distancing, lockdowns, etc.
reduce R0. The goal to design these control policies is to re-
duce R0 below 1 so that the case becomes an “endemic” and
the case numbers exponentially go down to 0. In other words, if
R0 > 1, the number of cases will continue to increase, chang-
ing the evolution of the cases/deaths curve.
A refined idea to address this issue is to pick t0 not based only
on thresholds, but based on the dates where lockdowns were put
in place in each region. We used data from IHME (Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation) with different publicly identi-
fied lockdown measures for different places [23]. These mea-
sures include the dates where restrictions where imposed, such
as mass gathering restrictions, stay at home order, educational
facilities closure, initial business closure, nonessential services
closure, etc. We pick the strictest lockdown date as t0 since for
the accuracy of our model we need R0 to be constant (and min-
imum) from then on. To our knowledge, the strictest lockdown
date would be the date of the last announced measures.
To complete this dataset and account for regions that are not
measured in this data, we augmented it with the mobility data
provided by Google and Apple regarding how people’s mobil-
ity has changed during the lockdown. This data is gathered
from people’s smartphones and assumes normal conditions as
the base-level, where the average mobility of people is around
0. When this data drops from 0, it implies that lockdowns may
have been imposed in a given region and as a result, the average
mobility has dropped. Figure 5 depicts the mobility changes
in four counties from Sweden - even though Sweden did not
formally have a lockdown, the spread of COVID caused peo-
ple to voluntarily reduce their movement, leading to an implicit
lockdown.
Figure 6 depicts the moving average for the number of deaths
in four regions. The graph on the left is time-aligned based on
the start of lockdown in each region, and the one on the right
depicts the chronological data. We observe that in the aligned
data, a clear pattern emerges and the number of death in those
regions are very similar. The reason why these regions are se-
lected to be presented is that the synthetic control model found
a high correlation in the number of deaths among them.
4.2 Impact of lockdowns
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Figure 7: the impact of lockdown in different regions, measured
by death count when interventions are applied.
The strictness of lockdown and the time it is applied in different
regions has a major impact on the spread of the virus. Figure
7 depicts the impact of lockdown using a scatter plot, where
each point represents a region. The y − axis represents the
peak value for each region (maximum number of daily deaths
in this case), and the x − axis is the number of days since the
intervention applied until the region has reached its peak. Also,
the size of each marker is proportional to the number of deaths
in each region on the day lockdown was imposed.
We observe that first, the higher number of deaths are on the
day of the lockdown, typically, the peak value is higher, and
second, for places with high death counts, the peak is reached
in roughly three weeks. This phenomenon was consistent, es-
pecially in the early days of the spread of COVID-19, with the
typical evolution of a fatal case - from infection to incubation
to death took roughly three weeks. In places with high fatalities
(the markers on top are Western European countries and New
York), this indicates that the lockdowns were strict and effec-
tive in immediately reducing the spread of infection down. In
other places where the fatalities were not that high on the date
of the lockdown, the infection continued to spread for several
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Figure 5: The average mobility reported by Google for four different Swedish counties during spread of COVID-19.
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days, and the peak happened several days after three weeks, in-
dicating a somewhat lax lockdown.
5 Results
In this section, we start by presenting how our synthetic con-
trol model works to predict the spread of the disease in dif-
ferent regions, as well as counterfactual and synthetic interven-
tion analysis. The counterfactual analysis aims to show how the
evolution of the disease would have looked had the lockdown
measures put in place earlier or later. Furthermore, using coun-
terfactuals and synthetic interventions, we show how different
policy measures impact the spread of the disease.
5.1 Predictions
We present an example of applying synthetic control to predict
how the spread of COVID would look in New York and com-
pare it to how it actually looked in New York. Furthermore, we
do a counterfactual analysis of the impact of lockdown impos-
ing dates. New York (City) had the closest correlation both in
terms of demographics as well in the spread of the virus with
Western European countries in the early days, and we use West-
ern Europe as the donor pool. Additionally, besides the similar-
ity in the way the pandemic was initially handled and the lock-
downs put in place, it was observed that the strain of the virus
that spread in New York came from Western Europe (primarily
Italy), rather than China [24].
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Figure 8: Prediction of NY cases and deaths versus reality. The
model has been trained for 20 days and used for ≈ 100 days of
prediction.
Figure 8 depicts the number of cases and deaths in New York
using our synthetic control model. The donor pool is selected
from Western Europe, and the graphs on the left show the nor-
malized weight of each region, where 8 regions with the highest
weights are selected to be shown.
We observe that the countries where COVID-19 hit more
heavily have higher weights in the synthetic control model as
opposed to the countries that managed to keep the number of
cases low. Furthermore, note that a bump which is observed in
the number of deaths after day 90 comes from the data source
and is due to the different measurement methods applied on
those days, which since occurs in all the regions, the synthetic
control model predicts it as well, and the shift is because West-
ern Europe was mostly ahead of New York during the spread.
5.2 Impact of lockdown: counterfactual analy-
sis
Figure 9 depicts how NY cases would have looked if the lock-
down had been imposed 10 days earlier, with the same donor
pool as Figure 8. We observe that if lockdown was imposed
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Figure 9: NY deaths counterfactual prediction if the lockdown
was done 10 days earlier, versus actual NY deaths.
earlier in NY, the number of cases would have decreased con-
siderably. Note that compared to Figure 8(b), the weight of
countries in which COVID-19 spread was more controlled has
increased since they have started the lockdown early on during
the spread, and if NY had locked down only 10 days earlier,
its spread pattern would have been more similar to those coun-
tries, with a significantly reduced death count. While the precise
values are not important and our results should be taken more
qualitatively, our models show that deaths in New York could
have been reduced by over 80% by pushing the lockdown 10
days ahead of when it was finally done.
Note that in performing predictions and building counterfac-
tuals, it is important to pick the right set of donor pool elements.
While in the early phase conditions matched between New York
and Western Europe, things have looked different in the sum-
mer of the northern hemisphere. Western Europe is undergoing
a significant second wave, whereas it is largely under control
in New York, and this can be seen in Figure 10 where the ac-
tual cases and deaths in New York are significantly lower than
the counterfactual built using the Western European donor pool.
One of the speculated reasons is that Western Europe opened
up indoor dining and bars whereas they are still banned in New
York. Also, consistent with the dynamics of the disease, deaths
are lagging cases by roughly three weeks in Western Europe.
5.3 Post-memorial day second wave in the US:
likely causes
In this section, we analyze how different regions differ in poli-
cies of temperature, bars and dining and reopening and if there
are any correlations between these factors and post-memorial
day spread.
5.3.1 Impact of post-Memorial Day temperatures and AC
usage
One of the postulated reasons for the second wave in the US has
been the summer heat and increased use of ACs, which cause
the virus droplets to recirculate. We employ (simple k-means)
clustering to divide the U.S. states into different regions, based
on their daily temperature after memorial day. Figure 11 depicts
that when the U.S. is divided into four regions based on temper-
ature. The graphs show the daily number of cases per million,
where the hottest states suffer the worst outbreak after memo-
rial day. Especially in the southern regions (cyan) which is the
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Figure 10: Post Memorial-Day Counterfactual predictions of
NY cases and deaths based on a Western European donor pool.
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Figure 11: regions clustered according to post-memorial day
temperature trends, and daily number of cases per million in
each region.
hottest, we observe that number of cases per million continues
to rise. However, all 4 regions displayed a second wave.
Table 1 shows the average temperature of each cluster, as
well as the average number of daily cases and deaths per million
for each, post-Memorial Day. The data in the table however
indicates that there is no clear correlation in the temperature
and case levels in the regions.
5.3.2 Impact of Bars and Indoor Dine-In
We use the data from [25] to depict the impact of Bars and in-
door dinings on the spread of the virus. New York, New Jer-
sey, Massachusetts2, and Connecticut banned all indoor dine-
ins, while in New Mexico, Kansas, District of Columbia, Rhode
Island, and North Carolina, indoor bar service was not allowed.
2Massachusetts allowed limited dine-in from late June, but most restaurants
did not open up immediately https://boston.eater.com/2020/6/
22/21298937/indoor-dining-massachusetts-restaurants-
june-22-guidelines
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region average temperature (F) average daily cases per million average daily deaths per million
Cluster 0 60.33 7984 136
Cluster 1 75.74 16819 375
Cluster 2 65.96 12427 375
Cluster 3 69.78 11608 414
Table 1: average number of daily cases and deaths per million in each region, post-Memorial Day
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Figure 12: Number of daily cases per million in states with
different indoor dining/bars policies. New York, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New Jersey restrict most indoor activities. In
New Mexico, Kansas, District of Columbia, Rhode Island, and
North Carolina, indoor bar service was not allowed.
We group the rest of the states together as ones that allow in-
door dining and bars. Figure 12 depicts this impact on the three
groups.
We observe that in states where indoor dining and bars were
not allowed, the number of cases reached to its maximum ear-
lier than the rest of the states, and then decreased very quickly
until it became much smaller than the number of cases in those.
The early peak was due to the early arrival of the virus on
those regions, which spread quickly before the lockdown poli-
cies were imposed. In the states where indoor dining and bars
were allowed, the number of daily cases per million kept in-
creasing until it became higher than the other two groups, even
though the initial number of daily cases was lower. Therefore,
we conclude that indoor dinings increase the spread of the virus,
and indoor bars increase it even further3.
5.3.3 Mobility Analysis
We have clustered different regions according to how their mo-
bility has changed after the lockdown. We used the mobility
data corresponding to “retail and recreation” from Google mo-
bility trends, and using the k-means clustering method, we re-
vealed 4 clusters representing how much and how soon the re-
gions have opened up.
Figure 13 depicts the four different clusters with different
mobility trends. In cluster 1, the mobility goes back to normal
3Note that the number of cases per million is a proxy of the density of cases,
i.e., it is computed as per capita infection rate ×1, 000, 000
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Figure 13: Four different clusters based on mobility trends of
the US states after the lockdown. The trends are derived from
Google’s mobility data on ‘retail and recreation”.
fairly quickly after the lockdown, whereas in cluster 0, the mo-
bility stays low for a longer period of time. Furthermore, com-
paring clusters 1 and 3, we observe that the mobility keeps in-
creasing and decreasing after the lockdown, respectively. Need-
less to say, there might be some regions clustered into a certain
group by the clustering model, and may not be sensible by look-
ing at the graphs.
Figure 14 depicts the regions belonging to each cluster, as
well as the moving average of their daily cases. We observe
that in clusters 0, 1, and 3, the number of daily cases continues
to rise, and their peak happens much later than that of cluster
2. However, in cluster 2, the number of daily cases reaches to
a maximum earlier and then begins to drop. In this figure, re-
gion 2 represents the North-East minus Pennsylvania. However,
comparing this to Figure 1, we observe that if we consider Penn-
sylvania in the North-East, the number of daily cases would be
slightly higher, indicating the Pennsylvania shows a different
behavior than the other states in the North-East with respect to
mobility and opening up.
5.4 Herd Immunity vs. Active Interventions
In different states of the United States, major outbreaks hap-
pened after memorial day. To analyze what has caused this be-
havior, we use the technique of Synthetic Interventions [10] to
analyze the data. We first set the intervention date to memorial
day, then, we train a model for each county based on a donor
pool of counties from a specific region. We picked “North-East”
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Figure 14: regions clustered according to post-lockdown mobil-
ity trends, and daily number of cases per million in each region.
to be our donor pool which is New England +(New York and
New Jersey)4. Then, we filter the donor pool to only include
counties at “similar stages” of coronavirus spread, i.e. coun-
ties that had similar case numbers, when the population was
adjusted. To do so, we first consider the number of cases per
million in each region, and then we pick donor counties in sim-
ilar range, within 50% of the cases of the target county. Fur-
thermore, to avoid overfitting, we use a low rank approximation
where we use three singular values for the matrix that has a
nominal rank at least 10x that number. Then, we compare the
synthetic model of each county with its actual behavior.
One factor which might have played a role in our analysis
is that since the spread started early in the North-East, enough
people may be infected and have “herd immunity”, which in
turn has slowed down the virus spread. Classical epidemiologi-
cal models like SEIR show a natural slowdown in the disease
spread as the fraction of people susceptible goes down, and
“herd immunity” as a concept is often discussed [26]. While
the number is still being debated, scientists believe that when a
certain fraction of the population (20% − 70% are the figures
currently under debate) have already been infected and immune
to the disease, the region will reach herd immunity. A natural
question to explore given our dataset is that the different behav-
iors we observe can be simply attributed to "herd immunity"
or do other factors like active interventions play a part in the
spread of the disease. Our prior analysis has shown that the
North-Eastern states have generally had stricter lockdown mea-
sures, whether it is the speed of reopening or mask mandates or
restricting group indoor activities like bars and dining.
One experiment to conduct and resolve this question is to
look into the data at a county level. Different counties in the
same state have had different levels of infection, and if state
policies don’t matter as much as herd immunity levels, then
the spread of the disease in different counties post-Memorial
Day would be very different, depending on the infection level.
Moreover, different counties in the different clusters we identi-
fied can likely have similar behavior to each other, as long as
the infection level was similar on Memorial Day.
We first begin by identifying counties in the North-East
where the virus hits early and compare them to similar coun-
ties in terms of infection cases in the rest of the US. Figure 15
4Note that in the previous section almost every way we cut the data, the
states that are in the North-East would belong to the cluster that had cases under
control after Memorial Day.
depicts different comparisons of this type. We picked counties
with varying levels of cases per million on Memorial Day and
constructed synthetic control models for all of them based on
a donor pool of counties from the North-East cluster. This is
in effect demonstrating a Synthetic Intervention [10], i.e. be-
havior of those counties had they mandated rules similar to the
ones in the North-East. In each of the examples depicted, we
can observe that the prediction for the counties in the North-
East cluster closely follows the actual behavior, whereas, for all
the example counties picked from other regions, there is a sig-
nificant departure (for the worse) from the counterfactual of the
actual cases. This indicates that the policies implemented in the
North-East states did have a significant effect on the spread of
the virus, and the difference in behavior from the other coun-
ties cannot be explained by infection level or "herd immunity"
alone.
To move from the anecdotal to statistical evidence of the im-
pact of herd immunity, and whether or not, in reality, it im-
pacts the spread we look at data across all counties of the US.
We examine if it plays a part, and if so at what level, and we
again start with the counties that have a similar number of in-
fections per million on Memorial Day, and pick a donor pool
from the North-East. We compare the predictions for the North
East counties vs counterfactual for the other counties, and com-
pare the mean squared errors across the two sets. To see at what
level herd immunity may occur, we use different bins of cases
per million, e.g. 6000, 8000, 10000, 12000, etc. and see if at
any number of cases, will the synthetic control model versus
actual model look similar across different regions.
Figure 16 depicts a comparison of the normalized mean
square error (normalized by total number of cases on Memorial
Day) of the prediction versus actual cases for the North-East
counties and for that of other counties. We observe that there is
a large gap between the mean squared error of the predictions
for the North-East and the other regions on the graph, which il-
lustrates how strongly the social distancing policies can impact
the spread given the different density of cases. This also con-
firms that the lockdown policies, including indoor dining prohi-
bition and mask mandates, have a much stronger impact on the
spread compared to "herd immunity" or infection levels. As the
case density starts to increase, there is a general trend of reduc-
tion of the difference, which is consistent with the models (e.g.,
SIER) that predict a natural slowing down of the spread of the
virus as the number of susceptible people decreases, however
as we can see by the sizes of the sets of counties (represented as
the size of the markers), the vast majority of the country is far
away from any herd immunity effects.
6 Conclusion
Synthetic Controls and Synthetic Interventions is a powerful
technique to do counterfactual analysis and predictions. For
COVID-19, they enable quick analysis of policy choices and
predicts the number of cases/deaths under different circum-
stances. In our paper, we demonstrated the ability of the
synthetic control method to predict and analyze the spread of
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Figure 15: comparison of synthetic control counterfactual
model of five counties within Northeast with five counties out-
side Northeast, with Northeast counties being the donor pool.
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Figure 16: Average Mean squared error of the predictions for
North-East and counter factual synthetic intervention for other
counties, plotted as a function of case density on memorial day.
The size of the marker reflects the number of counties repre-
sented in that data point
.
COVID-19. Our models indicate that an earlier lockdown could
have resulted in a significantly lower death count in New York,
and this is true of most other places. Further, by analyzing the
post-Memorial Day data at a county level, we show that inter-
vention policies like mask mandates, mobility, and indoor din-
ing/bar rules matter significantly in the spread of COVID-19.
Counties that have stricter lockdown and social distancing man-
dates behaved significantly better than equivalent counties (i.e.
with a similar infection level per capita) elsewhere with looser
rules.
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